A very brief comment on the recent presidential election in the United States. There has been some discussion of the differences between opinion poll estimates of the popular vote for the two main candidates, and the vote that they actually received. Anthony Wells has a short post on the topic and I'm sure many more can be found.
A peculiarity of US elections is the early publication of exit polls. There's a piece in Slate about this. Those who stayed up to watch the election coverage on television will have noticed how, early in the night, the Kerry campaign team were reported as being upbeat and the Bush team downbeat; this reversed later in proceedings. The reason, perhaps, was that exit poll data which became known early in the evening (US time) suggested that Kerry would win in critical states (by two points in Ohio and Florida, for instance) and, therefore, win the election; later, as real results came in, it seemed more likely that Bush would win, as he eventually did.
It is certainly true that the reported exit poll data look substantially different to the last reported pre-election polls: (significance: p-value < 0.0001)
(Pre-election polls from Andrew Tannenbaum's electoral-vote.com; exit polls as reported in Slate.)
I don't know enough about exit poll methodology to say anything very useful about this.
Next let us reach briefly into conspiracy theory territory.
A number of states in the United States use `Diebold' direct-recording electronic voting machines, which are touchscreen operated and lack paper receipts. These devices are manufactured by a company whose owners give money to the Republican party. Such machines are suitable only for people who do not care about keeping their elections honest, because it is impossible to audit their results. I have written before about how such devices are not appropriate for elections in this country (although unaccountably the government do not listen).
Suppose that pre-election opinion polls accurately (to within some margin of error) divine the voting intentions of electors. Suppose further that actual election results may be affected by fraud in certain states, but that opinion poll results are not.
In these circumstances, you would expect the distribution of differences between the lead of a candidate as reported in opinion polls to have approximately a zero mean for states which do not suffer from fraud, and to have a mean which differs significantly from zero where fraud has occured (assuming that all fraud is intended to give advantage to the same side).
Here is the plot of poll vs. election result discrepancies for states which use Diebold direct-recording electronic voting machines (per this list, but with the addition of Florida and Ohio, and the removal of California, to account for more recent developments):
| States |
Mean discrepancy (% points) |
95% confidence interval (% points) |
|---|---|---|
| non-Diebold | -0.26 | -2.22 < d < +1.70 |
| Diebold | +2.71 | +0.53 < d < +4.89 |
Note that positive numbers for the discrepancies mean that Kerry got fewer votes than predicted by the polls.
The two distributions -- for Diebold and non-Diebold states -- do differ significantly (p-value = 0.040, i.e. ``significant at the 95% level'', with the 95% confidence interval on the difference in means being 0.15 to 5.81). Therefore, on this very naive analysis, there is some evidence for voting-machine fraud in the recent US presidential election.
(Caveats: don't take this too seriously. In particular, it was done hastily for my own entertainment and I haven't checked the provenance of the polls from the Andrew Tannenbaum site or independently verified the types of voting machines in use in the various states. Plus, the implicit assumption above that polls should accurately predict electoral results even in states where the election is honest is... a bit of a leap. In particular methodology may differ from state to state or cultural differences between the states may bias the results of telephone polling. The states which use Diebold voting machines do not necessarily use them everywhere. Etc. etc. Wait for somebody to do the analysis carefully and properly before you go round to Diebold HQ with the pitchforks and the flaming torches. In my defence, this is probably more socially responsible than spreading rumours about electoral fraud -- I assume there are some -- and given that there is no other way to audit the results, I hope that there is further work on this issue. On the same subject, you may also want to read this piece about auditing the recent Venezuelan recall election, which suggests how such audits may be manipulated even where paper receipts are recorded.)


Comments
Posted by Julian T. J. Midgley, Friday, 5 November 2004 00:02 (link):
Note that, thanks to the lack of a paper audit trail, Diebold will be completely unable to prove that there hasn't been any fraud...
Posted by dsquared, Friday, 5 November 2004 08:41 (link):
There's a post on gregpalast.com in which he tackles this issue with his usual combination of caution, tact and nuance (ie, none of any of them). The issue here is that even in a totally honest election, there will be a wedge between exit polls and results if the distribution of spoiled ballot papers is not random. In other words, the exit polls are likely to pick up people who believe themselves to have cast a valid ballot but who in fact have not. Since the Democrats are stronger among the categories of people who I would think a priori are more likely to have spoiled their ballot papers without knowing it (ie, the illiterate, the poorly educated - let's not mince words here, the black), there's an inherent bias which is going to be worse in areas where it's easier to spoil a ballot. How do the Diebold states do on % of ballots spoiled?
By the way, forestalling any angry mob that might be forming, I mean no political implication or insinuation at all by characterising the Democrats' support in this way; it's an easily verifiable fact that the Democrats do better among black people, poor people and people who can't read.
Posted by Chris Lightfoot, Friday, 5 November 2004 09:26 (link):
`Kerry Won...' by Greg Palast.
From a brief look at the report linked to in the Palast piece, there doesn't seem to be a striking difference in spoiled ballot rate between Diebold and non-Diebold states, but that would probably bear further investigation. (There's also the question of distribution of spoiled ballots and distribution of population.)
Posted by Pete Stevens, Friday, 5 November 2004 11:58 (link):
Er, how do you get a spoiled ballot with electronic voting? I thought the point was to get rid of them so all votes are accurately recorded.
Posted by Chris Lightfoot, Friday, 5 November 2004 12:11 (link):
Well, most direct-recording electronic voting machines are supposed to prevent spoiled ballots, though there have been reports of poor user-interface design leading to users believing that they have voted when in fact they have not. (This issue is separate from the trust problem.) But most US states (including some of those in the `Diebold' list) use a variety of methods (including punch-card machines and optically-read paper ballots), many of which can actually record spoiled ballots.
One of the (many) problems in Florida in 2000 was that poorer counties tended to have older and less reliable voting machines (because they had less tax revenue to spend on them), and therefore a higher spoiled ballot rate. Poorer counties are also more likely to vote Democrat.
Posted by Toby Bryans, Friday, 5 November 2004 13:10 (link):
Thursday's comp.risks newsletter has some interesting discussion of the technology used in the election.
Posted by sinan, Friday, 5 November 2004 16:59 (link):
It so seems that had Kerry's team developed a special voting campaign directed to the groups like the jews or the hispanics in the critical states, the things could have well developed differently. Maybe they though about it but it is obvious that it was not carried out in an efficient manner.
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