So, that ID Cards Bill, eh? And I'm sorry to keep banging on about this, but -- joking aside -- it's bloody serious.
Just to dispose of one point, David Blunkett has been in the news a lot lately for other reasons. For instance, I happened to see a copy of the godawful bloody Express the other day, which had a headline reading something like,
David Blunkett
Is he fit to serve Britain?
... to which the answer is, ``no, but not for the reason you think.'' The stock answer to questions about the Home Secretary's private life is, of course, ``it's none of our business; I just wish he'd think the same about ours'', and I'm going to stick to that formula. It's one that the Prime Minister's Official Spokesman endorses, after all:
The Prime Minister said that senior Ministers were entitled to a private life, so long as they continued to do their job.
You can read the Bill on-line; it's substantially the same as the draft. If you haven't looked at either, it's probably worth your while to do so to find out what you'll be made to do before you're summoned to appear at some Capita office to have your irises scanned and all that jazz.
First, to dispel some myths. The government claim that the scheme is voluntary; that you will not be forced to produce an ID card to gain access to a public service to which you are entitled (e.g., to see your GP); and that you will not be forced to carry an ID card nor be required to present it to a police officer or other official on demand.
The first two claims are false. Section 6 of the Bill permits the Home Secretary to force anyone he wants to register for a card (subject to a vote in Parliament, but those wankers will vote for anything, as the passage of various panicked acts after September 11th 2001 shows); section 15 is advertised as preventing the government from making access to services conditional upon presentation of a card, but doesn't apply to people who have been forced to register. So the Home Office can say, ``right, time for everyone to get an ID card'', and suddenly you can be forced to produce one every time you go to the doctor.
Every time you the card is checked, the occasion will be recorded in the Register, for perusal by an extensive list of government bodies (see s.19 of the Bill).
The third statement -- that you will not be forced to carry a card nor to present it on demand -- is true, but according to the Home Office irrelevant. They believe that the `biometric' which will be used on the card is perfect; that is, that each individual can be reliably looked up in the database by scanning their irises or their fingerprints or whatever. They believe that the effect of carrying a card for presentation on demand can be achieved by giving police officers biometric scanners. (As I've remarked before, I expect this to be a godawful cock-up. The Home Office will hand out copies of the National Identity Register on DVDs or something, since they probably won't be able to make a wireless data network that's actually reliable enough for use in this application. Expect to download your copy of the NIR via the peer-to-peer network of your choice about as soon as the thing is implemented in 2008.)
Even more bonkers, the government's Regulatory Impact Assessment suggests that you're quite likely to be asked for a card when you go to the shops, so unless you're a total ascetic you may have to carry the fucking thing at all times anyway.
(It's also worth remarking that the Impact Assessment doesn't consider anything other than direct, monetary costs in its cost/benefit analysis. It doesn't, for instance, measure the effect upon civil liberties. It also -- as usual -- makes the mistake of assuming that the programme will reduce identity fraud. I guess writing these things isn't taken very seriously.)
It's worth pausing for a moment to consider what the government are up to with s.6 of the Bill. The relevant bit reads,
(1) The Secretary of State may by order impose an obligation on individuals of a description specified in the order to be entered in the Register.
The idea here is that the Home Secretary can require, for instance, anybody who is an eeeeevil foreigner, or a fox-hunter, or Jewish, or whatever, to register for an ID card if he wants them to. Neither the Bill nor the notes explain what the fuck this is for -- to me, it looks as if they're not even trying to not look like crazed authoritarian fucknuts -- but the implication is that this power would be used only to make everyone register. So that's OK then. Because, after all, governments never use powers they're given for any but the originally-stated purpose.
(For the avoidance of doubt: David Blunkett clearly isn't a Nazi, and neither are any of the rest of the present government, so far as I know. But as they keep saying, nothing they do can bind any future Parliament.)
Actually, there's quite a bit of this ``not even trying'' going on. Hilariously, they haven't even fixed s.12(4) in which
The things that an individual may be required to do under subsection (3) are--
-- this is the same as in the draft, and they haven't even bothered to add `reasonable' as many responses to the consultation suggested. Presumably if some bored Crapita employee does send out a notice of the form,
You are required to attend the summit of Mt. Snowdon at 0300h tomorrow morning so that we can take your fingerprints; failure to attend will be punished by a civil penalty of £1,000. Do not pass `go'.
the courts will eventually tell him to go fuck himself, but we have to wait to find out.
2(5) is even better -- here, the Home Secretary is given the power to correct errors in the Register, but is freed from the duty to do so. I'm not really sure why the Home Secretary -- who, it should be said, seems awfully keen on putting all our personal information in his database -- wants to be able to keep wrong information in there, but he's giving himself the power to for some reason.
(No but seriously.... One effect of the National Identity Register is to make it impossible to -- for instance -- give new identities to informants who are threatened by the criminals or terrorists against whom they have given evidence, since if everyone in the country is identified on the Register by an iris scan, and the criminals in question have a photograph of the informant, it will be trivial for them to locate him and kill him. It is possible that the Home Office believe that this is undesirable and that 2(5) is a loophole that they've inserted to try to make such false identities practical again. It won't work, of course -- if they get their way, having an inaccurate ID card will be so fucking inconvenient that informants will probably accept the risk of being murdered simply to avoid the hassle -- but it would be nice to think that they're making an effort.)
Elsewhere we have been reassured that the information stored in the Register will be of a limited nature and that, for instance, you will not be required to give a sample of your DNA for recording there. This too is a lie; while the current -- and hardly inextensive -- list of things to be recorded does not include genetic information, s.3(5) allows the Home Secretary to, without giving a reason or requiring the approval of Parliament,
modify the information for the time being set out in Schedule 1.
i.e. to add or (much less likely) remove things from the list.
Elsewhere, the government have avoided the temptation to add safeguards to the legislation to in any way soften the trainwreck about to engulf us. I (and presumably many others) pointed out in consultation responses that the existence of a unique identifying number in the National Identity Register will make identity theft much easier and more dangerous (the government lie that their scheme will make identity theft harder!). I wrote,
Frankly I have no idea how you would go about fixing this. If you insist on having a single Register with a single primary key, theres probably nothing that can be done; you just have to put up with increased identity fraud. An alternative would be to issue cards locally (as in many European countries) and ensure that any number assigned to an individual identifies the card, not the person. The card numbers won't be a lot of use to third parties (as they will change when new cards are issued every few years) and so third parties will not be attracted to using them; this removes this particular opportunity for fraud. (It would also make the scheme cheaper and more reliable, since it remove the single point of failure which the national Register constitutes.)
An alternative would be to try to keep the identity numbers secret. I donbt really see how this could be managed, though, unless there are no unique numbers on the card at all. Since the draft Bill isn't tied to any technical solution, I doubt it would be possible to incorporate this safeguard, so we're back to square one.
As a workaround, the Bill could create an offence of ``using a number from the Register to identify a person in another database''.
Needless to say, these bozos haven't done any of those things.
So, in summary, it's going to be a disaster, as designed. My suggestion? Start looking for countries to flee to now, before the queues get too long.
But while you're still here, please take a moment to read the Bill and NO2ID's useful FAQ; you can still register your support on their petition; and if you're in Cambridge this Monday (6th December) please come to the meeting of the Cambridge group in the Old Spring on Chesterton Road at eight o'clock.
Comments
Posted by Nick, Sunday, 5 December 2004 04:06 (link):
Just looking at your comments about Section 6 and Section 15, and even after reading them I'm confused - by the Bill, not your comments.
Under section 15, providers of services are allowed to demand ID from people who've been forced to have cards under section 6, yet not from other people. How are they meant to distinguish between the two types of people without demanding to see some form of ID anyway? Is Blunkett going to issue the rest of us with a letter that says we've not been compelled to have an ID card? So, even without the Home Office saying we all have to get a card, we might have to get one anyway to show that we haven't been compelled to get one.
Under any other circumstances I'd assume the absurdity of having to get a card to prove that you've not been compelled to get a card was me making a mistake, but as this whole Bill is so misconceived, I'm not sure.
Posted by Guy Herbert, Tuesday, 7 December 2004 14:36 (link):
A further point about clause 15 is that it appears not to be restricted to the public sector. That is to say, once ID registration is compulsory for a significant fraction of the population, private firms will be able to make supply of services conditional upon production. This is in line with the Government's acknowledged intent (see the regulatory impact assessment) to encourage such use, the better to ensure universal compliance. It is no doubt entirely coincidental that this would also enhance the capacity for universal surveillance no end.
Though the clause allows the Government to say that services won't be denied to those without a card, it is far from clear that services could not in practice be made conditional on an NIR number or direct biometric scan, since that would not involve production of the card. More misdirection of public attention to the physical card? Or just bad drafting?
Posted by Shane McC, Sunday, 5 December 2004 18:44 (link):
Your arguments seem spot on but will be difficult for the average Sun reader to follow. How much will it cost? I read on Kablenet that £85 for a passport and ID card (at 2004 prices) is the current estimate. This is on top of the initial set up cost. Put that to the average Sun reader along with the lack of benefits of the system and people might start to react to the bill.
Posted by Harry Hutton, Monday, 6 December 2004 00:43 (link):
Charles Moore is attacking ID cards in this week's Spectator. Says Conservatives should be opposing them more. I can't link- it's free, but you need to register.
Posted by Pete Stevens, Monday, 6 December 2004 12:28 (link):
You appear to have missed one of the prime motivating factors to force people to get ID cards.
As of some fairly recent time, it became illegal to employ someone who doesn't have a right to work, i.e. the employer must act as the immigration service and verify that person $foo has a right to work. At present the employer may ask for any random authentic looking piece of paper and that's reasonable enough. Under the new ID cards scheme, it will be much easier for the employer to simply demand to see you ID card, no ID card => no job.
Posted by Chris Williams, Monday, 6 December 2004 14:38 (link):
No ID card = no job. Well, that's illegal immigration sorted then. Luckily, there are no employers in this country conning the IR and the VAT by not declaring all their workers, and there are no self-employed people working cash in hand. Phew, that was close.
Meanwhile, back in the real world...
Posted by Chris Lightfoot, Monday, 6 December 2004 17:49 (link):
Actually this seems to be the key use of ID cards. They're excellent for making sure that law-abiding people abide by the law (in certain, very narrowly, circumstances). Criminals and other people who couldn't give a fig for the law will, of course, not be affected.
Posted by David Gillies, Wednesday, 8 December 2004 23:28 (link):
How much will this cost? Conservatively, I'd say 11 figures. That's 10 billion smackeroos and upwards. Probably closer to £20 billion and maybe a few hundred million a year to run. Of course it won't work; large-scale public database projects never do (London Ambulance Service, CSA, Wessex Health, Canadian gun registry, and so on ad libertam). But it will be a right royal pain in the arse finding this out, oodles of cash will have been thrown away, and hundreds of us poor peons will have been caught in the cogs. Now, more than ever, am I glad I emigrated.
Posted by Colin Teubner, Thursday, 9 December 2004 18:25 (link):
Two questions for you, Chris:
First, is it the mere idea of having a National Identity Register at all, complete with some sort of scheme for matching people to it, that worries you, or is it the inevitably poor implementation of it, or both?
Here in the US I must produce identification with a name that matches my boarding pass before getting on a plane. Names on plane tickets are checked against some list somewhere that's kept highly secret, but apparently if your name is on the wrong column in said list, you won't be allowed to fly. I can think of several ways to get around this no problem.
(Note for those who think college students can't produce fake IDs that will get past airport security: Nightclub bouncers and liquor store proprietors look much more closely at my driver's license than TSA employees do. And the fake IDs are created with the former in mind.)
In other words, I can think of reasons having such a register would be beneficial - security, access to my medical records when I'm unconscious, etc. The privacy concerns are obvious but it's possible to envision an implementation of the Register that would prevent privacy problems (though it is admittedly unlikely the government would go with it.)
Second, do you think you and other Britons distrust your government (in terms of wasting your tax dollars, protecting your privacy and therefore property, and/or getting you killed) more than I or other Americans do? It seems so, as I trust mine a tiny bit where you don't trust yours at all. And along those lines, does that have something to do with size of government or tax rates?
Posted by Abhinay Mehta, Friday, 10 December 2004 14:39 (link):
In reply to your second question Colin, I think us Britons do trust our government(well, that’s arguable, but anyway ...) , but the main issue here is not if we trust this current government but how do you know what type of government is to take power in the future? How can you trust the people that you don't know yet? No way can you or anyone make me believe that every other government that is ever going to take office is going to handle this data in the proper way with FULL responsibility and sensitivity till the next mass-extinction on earth.
Posted by Chris Lightfoot, Tuesday, 14 December 2004 13:50 (link):
OK. I've answered the first of these at length in another post. But a couple of brief comments here:
The really important point about putting names on airline tickets is that it eliminates the secondary market in those tickets. I can't buy up tickets in advance of a flight, when they're cheaper, and flog them on eBay to other people, because the purchasers wouldn't be named on the tickets and would be unable to fly with them (depending on how lax airport security is nowadays). Airlines love price discrimination (economists generally think it's pretty sexy too) because it lets them charge each customer approximately as much as they're prepared to pay. This is `economically efficient' but also maddening -- I don't want to sit next to someone who paid a tenth as much as I did for their flight.
(Incidentally, and following your comments on students and fake ID, the last time ID cards were proposed here -- in 1993 -- the primary justification was not stopping terrorism, but stopping underage drinking. That's an argument which isn't trotted out very often any more. So far as I understand it, requiring checks of a driving licence or similar hasn't stamped out the menace of underage drinking in the United States, but perhaps biometrically scanning people every time they go to the pub or off-licence will. Meanwhile in the real world, I assume that underage drinkers will be able to buy booze if they want it; the real problem with underage drinking -- and indeed much overage drinking -- is cultural, rather than a simple matter of age, but don't expect this government to spot that.)
As I've said elsewhere, when you gain convenience you usually lose security. I don't expect the National Identity Register to be a big fluffy friendly thing which helps out paramedics tending to the unconscious and makes us more secure from THE TERRORISTS; I expect it to be a big messy cockup which is mostly of use to snoopers and identity fraudsters.
Now, there are two ways to look at trust. The first is a fuzzy and emotional thing: do I expect the government to do right by me? More-or-less, yes, though in the case of ID cards I fear that it will make a dangerous and expensive mess. The second way is based on the idea that you can be said to `trust' something if, if it goes wrong, it can really mess up your life. On that basis, we all trust the government; we have no choice about it.
On a more general note-- I think people in Britain are generally much happier with `big government' than people in the United States are (this is just my impression). It's often said that Americans wouldn't put up with a National Health Service, for instance; now, I've no idea whether that's true, but it certainly seems that they wouldn't put up with a government which tried to establish one. In this country most of these decisions are now in the distant past. In 1945 the country emerged from a disastrous but necessary war with more-or-less complete control of the economy, and a political party which promised to use that power to establish almost all of the public services which we now identify with the `welfare state' was elected by a landslide, and now they are immutable features of the British state. (Personally, I'd say this was a good thing in most cases.) But I don't think we, as a rule, have high expectations of how well the government implements its policies or how wisely it chooses them.
Posted by Tez Burke, Friday, 10 December 2004 16:24 (link):
A good read as ever, Chris (have added you to the lj friends list, by the way), but looking at the tone of your post it's as if the whole thing is lost and Blunkett's insidious Bill will automatically become an Act. It's time that a broad-based resistance can be galvanised, preferably before certain entryist groups get their mitts anywhere near the No2ID campaign (cf. what happened re the Stop The War Coalition), and it would be particularly interesting to note which Labour MPs oppose the Bill; of the front bench I gather that Brown, Straw, Hewitt and Short are agin it. Don't ever give up the good fight!
And Harry's point is very relevant; a clear and coherent argument against the card from the Conservative benches is yet to be heard. One gets the feeling that David Davis is merely using the Blunkett/Quinn affair as an excuse to seize the moral high ground rather than do anything worthwhile to oppose the Bill, authoritarian that he is.
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